Since the mid 2000s, a cottage industry has slowly blossomed of empirical research dedicated to advancing accounts of contracts "on the books"-accounting for what contracts tend to purportedly obligate signers to do, and contracts "in action"-accounting for how contracting parties tend to behave. This article reviews this literature, which spans several disciplines, most notably law, economics, and management, identifying eight categories of empirical questions in common across all disciplines, highlighting key findings, points of consensus, and noting areas most pressingly in need of additional research.
INTRODUCTION
Empirical exploration of contracts is not a new thing. Some trace the roots of serious empirical exploration of private contracting to Stewart Macaulay's seminal work in 1963. It may be said that empirics are playing catch-up to theory, which has had a significantly longer tradition in scholarship in law and social sciences. To understand the diversity of disciplinary approaches and framings of questions about contracts raised in modern empirical explorations, it may be useful to briefly articulate the intertwined trajectory of contract doctrine, theory, and empirics.
Contracts are historically ancient means of managing and regulating dyadic exchanges.
Contract's doctrinal roots are traceable to actions in assumpsit, which were variations on trespass, used in varied contexts like debt collection, marriage enforcement, surgical mishaps, and similar transactions. An action in contract distinct from trespass was perhaps first noted in 1348 in the case of the Humber Ferryman (Simpson 1987) . In that case, a ferryman was paid for transporting the plaintiff's horse across a body of water, but the horse drowned allegedly due to the ferryman's miscalculations. Consideration was added to the doctrinal contractual landscape in the sixteenth century. In the Golding's Case, the Solicitor-General made what could be the first statement of a clear general principle of consideration, when he declared that, "in every action upon the case upon a promise, there are three things considerable: consideration, promise, and breach of promise" (Simpson 1987: 319) .
Contract law evolved in parallel with liberal democratic ideals about free market exchange. In fact, since their modern formalization as legal, state-backed instruments, contractual exchange has been hailed as the foundation of both capitalism and the liberal state (Farnsworth 1982; Friedman 1965; Macaulay 1985; Selznick 1969; Smith 1904; Thompson 1975) . Under the common liberal theoretical version of contract formation, contract enforceability was grounded in law as much as, and in harmony with moral concerns, social constraints, and instrumental calculations. As a result, contracts provided formal state-backed instruments that seemed to obviate the need for reliance on alternative means of ensuring that deals were enforced (Blau 1968) . Courts, legislators, and scholars in various fields have described contracts as the product of bilaterally exchanged commitments freely negotiated and agreed upon by the parties (Macaulay 1963; McIntyre 1994) . As Friedman (1965) notes, "…the law of contract was the legal reflection of [the free] market and naturally took on its characteristics."
Contracts represented a doctrinal embodiment of the collectively imagined paradigmatic free economic exchange in which mutually dependent actors with relatively equal access to legal resources, and relatively equal abilities to know and understand their respective needs and desires freely negotiated terms and then memorialized them in written instruments. The law assumed that individuals could serve their private interests by contract, and that contracts served the public interest by creating predictable reciprocal obligations (Slawson 1996) . More specifically, one could point to at least the following five assumptions about how contracting parties behave as embodying the underlying theme of free market contracting: (1) parties know what they want (they understand their preferences); (2) they have relatively clear expectations about what their contracting counterparts want (they have a good sense of their counterparts' preferences); (3) they understand when they have entered into a contract; (4) they generally feel bound to perform as obligated by lawful contracts into which they knowingly entered; and, (5) if they breach, they know that they are breaching.
Imagine, for instance, a bridge builder contracting with a component part manufacturer.
Each generally understands what terms they want and do not want to be memorialized in their contract, what the terms mean, and what will happen if they fail to perform, roughly to the same degree. Each has at least a minimal threshold understanding of the mechanics of the deal, and each probably feels bound to perform the terms to which they meaningfully assented in the absence of typical contract defenses like duress or unconscionability. Under these circumstances, it would seem odd not to require each party to fully bear the responsibility for obligations into which they knowingly entered even if a court later determined that the deal was substantively unfair to one of the parties. Indeed, the law often treats a promise to do something as an indication that the promisor intends to perform as promised (Ayres and Klass 2005) . For the most part, this is what the law did and continues to do.
Over time, contract law might not have evolved very much away from these assumptions, but contract scholarship has. As theory developed, contract was often conceived of as being in stark relief from what doctrine aspired for contract to be. Famously, Grant Gilmore (1974 ), Charles Fried (1981 ), and Ian MacNeil (1985 theorized on contract's doctrinal shortcomings born out of the discord between how contract is experienced and how the law assumes contract is experienced. Perhaps it was the earlier work by Stewart Macaulay (1963) that evaluated the circumstances under which parties sought enforcement of terms in contracts between businesses that partially paved the way for these theoretical reconceptualizations. Since that paper, which provocatively opened by asking, "[w]hat good is contract law? Who uses it?
When and how," a growing number of scholars employing an expanding arsenal of methodological techniques have continued to probe the relationship between how people are supposed to behave around contracts, and how they actually behave, as Macaulay did in 1963. As others have observed (Becher 2009a) , there is a wide gap between contract law's underlying assumptions and the modern reality of how contract is often experienced. This seems to be one of several driving forces behind the growth of empirical scholarship on contracts that has burgeoned in recent years. The primary alternative, but parallel, driving force is the use of contracts to vet disciplinary-based theories. This appears to be most true for economic theories. This paper next maps this evolving landscape, identifying common threads across disciplines as well as gaps fillable by future research. Recommendations are then offered for productive ways to expand on empirical contractual studies both substantively and methodologically.
EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
This paper's focus is on providing a critical survey of the recent literature on empirical analyses of contracts, and on offering directions for future research. This could be done effectively in several ways. I have chosen to do this by categorizing existing research as attempting to answer one or more of the eight empirical questions specified below:
(1) How do courts interpret contracts?
(2) What is the relationship between public policy (laws) and contract terms? (Bal et al. 2008) , sociology papers on the "social contract" (Kochan and Shulman 2007) , and labor law papers focused on collective bargaining, as well as other papers in areas not primarily epicentered on contracts, like work on consumer choices on service contracts (Chen, Kalra and Sun 2009 ). This quasi-formal empirical method led us to papers mostly from law, economics, management, psychology, and sociology, and hybrid "law-and-" disciplines like "law and economics."
We identified 113 scholarly articles from 2005 through January of 2012, which form the basis of the discussion and analysis in this article. The eight questions listed above emerged from reviewing and coding these 113 papers. I group these questions as originating from one or both of two propositions that epitomize distinct approaches to empirically understanding behaviors around contracts:
Contracts are a product of how drafters and signers interpret the law.
PROPOSITION 2:
Contracts are a product of factors exogenous to the law.
The two propositions are not mutually exclusive. In fact, I have written about how and when they overlap (Eigen 2008) . They are distinct in their sources for motivating or framing empirical research on contracts. In this sense, they offer alternative poles for motivating or addressing the eight questions identified across disciplines. Figure 1 depicts how one could think of the eight empirical questions as tending to align according to the propositional poles.
For instance, questions about courts' interpretations of contracts (DiMatteo 2006; Zeiler and Krawiec 2005) , and the relationship between public policy and contract terms (Dietz 2011; Kurschilgen 2011) tend to be more consistently motivated by the notion that answering these questions will inform behavioral outcomes because contracts are the product of drafters' and signers' interpretation of law. Factors exogenous to the law seem less relevant to the inquiry (whether they are measured or not). However, the primary motivation for empirical pursuits focused on these questions tends to be the first proposition and not the second. On the other side of the spectrum, empirical evaluations of the relationship between contracts and trust, which come mostly from management studies, are motivated by theories of trust and reciprocity in dyadic exchanges, or other decision making theories, which tend to be conceptualized in the absence of law (Chou, Halevy and Murninghan 2012; Lumineau and Malhotra 2011) . They are primarily concerned with contracts as functions of factors exogenous to law.
Questions 4 through 7 are in the middle of the two poles because this cluster of questions tends to be motivated by either or both propositions. Papers addressing question 4, (do signers read their contracts?) tend to be more motivated by the first proposition than the second, often because of the assumption that reading contracts is an essential component of notice about terms, and hence their enforceability (Becher 2009b; Hillman 2009 ). Papers addressing question 4 are also mostly about form-contracts or "boilerplate," which are a fruitful and important ground for continued empirical study discussed more below. But, it is sometimes the case that this vector of scholarship is also motivated by factors exogenous to law as explanations (Bakos 2009; Plaut and Bartlett 2011) . Hence, this question is located closer to the middle of the two propositions in Figure 1 .
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Question 5 (how do individuals perceive, interpret, or experience contract terms?) is located as close to the middle of the two propositions as any of the questions. This question also spans the most disciplines (economics, law, law and economics, law and society, and management contracts with the expectation that the agreements' unfavorable terms will not be enforced against them. In both of these instances and in others, the empirical explorations are motivated by both propositions: contracts are the product of individuals perceptions of law as well as factors exogenous to the law such as norms of behavior, and social and moral constraints.
The sixth question (what is the relationship between contract terms and performance, breach, or renegotiation?) has become more important over time. In fact, five of the six empirical contracts papers identified in 2012 fall under this category (Brooks, Stremitzer and Tontrup 2012; Eigen 2012b; Feldman, Schurr and Teichman 2012; Lumineau and Quelin 2012; Nikolaev 2012) . These papers examine behavior of contracting parties as a function of their perceptions of the contracts into which they have entered, or as a function of the contracts themselves, assuming a relatively uniform interpretation of the contract terms, obviating the need for a measure of individual interpretation of the terms. Law is relevant here, but the primary focus on behavior tends to evidence motivation drawn closer to the second proposition than the first.
The same could be said about the seventh question (are contract terms associated with contractor characteristics or contracting settings?). However, the motivation for papers answering this question tends to align more closely with the second proposition than the first.
This is perhaps a function of the fact that the characteristics and contracting settings studied tend to most frequently derive from economic theories. For instance, Brown, et al. (2006) explore the relationship between risk preference and terms in employment contracts. were published in management journals; 23% in economics journals, and 9% in law and economics journals. Four papers (3.5%) came from finance journals, two (1.8%) from law and society related journals, one (.9%) from econometrics/statistics, and one (.9%) from law and psychology. Figure 3 depicts the distribution of scholarly work by discipline over the time period in question.
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A few observations may be worth noting here. First, management journals and law journals appear to be consistent and slowly growingly receptive outlets for empirical work on contracts. It may be surprising to some readers how little relative publication space is allocated to empirical work on contracts in psychology and sociology. My suspicion is that this is due to the perception by some in these disciplines of contracts as legal instruments, which belong in "law and psychology" or "law and sociology" journals instead of psychology or sociology outlets. This might be a function of the perceived limitations of the set of eight questions identified above, and the pull of the first proposition as being perceived as a substitute for testable hypotheses derived from psychology and sociology instead of as a compliment.
Economics, by contrast, while not an entirely consistent market for empirical work on contracts, has been more receptive than these other disciplines. Economists seem to be drawn to empirical work on contracting because this setting offers fruitful grounds to demonstrate how private exchanges confirm or undermine traditional economic theories, often regarding rationality and efficiency in a market setting. Lastly, perhaps, optimistically, it is worth noting the positive trend of total scholarly papers devoted to empirical exploration of contracts across all disciplines. If the papers reviewed from only January of this year are any indication, 2012 is projected to be a banner year for work in this area across all disciplines.
Findings
Recent empirical work on contracts has advanced our understanding of how contracting entities experience contracts in important ways. First, there is growing consensus among researchers that actors do not consistently behave rationally, or in ways that optimize efficiency. This has been important particularly for those interested in how contracts may be written to incentivize performance (Brooks, Stremitzer and Tontrup 2012; Fehr, Hart and Zehnder 2011b; Feldman and Teichman 2011) . Studies on reference points (Fehr, Hart and Zehnder 2011a) , effects of formal versus flexible contract terms (Green and Heywood 2011) , and opportunities for renegotiation (Nikolaev 2012 ) exemplify how much context and framing influence behavior around contracts, perhaps more so than the terms themselves. For instance, a study by Hannan, Hoffman, and Moser (2005) found that employees were more averse to having to pay a penalty than they were to not receiving a bonus, and therefore chose a higher level of effort under a penalty contract. They also found that individuals perceived the bonus contract as more fair than the penalty contract, and therefore were more likely to work harder in reciprocity.
A second particularly robust finding emergent from empirical work on contracts is that moral constraints are important in understanding how individuals interpret contractual obligations. Perhaps empirical evidence of the relative effects of morality in contracting is overdue. The notion of "keeping one's promise" has origins in the bible: "[i]f a man…takes an oath to bind himself…he shall not violate his word" (Numbers 30:2). Durkheim (1893) argued that contracts could not exist without a preexisting set of institutionalized moral agreements.
Modern theorists have argued for morality's central role for decades (Atiyah 1979; Fried 1981 ).
As Sutton described, "in effect, contract law… defines the nature of contractual obligations and invokes a transcendent authority to ensure that they will be enforced" ( Empirical research has recently begun probing whether and to what extent the proliferation of form-adhesive contracts represents an attempt by organizations to exploit individuals. Sociologists of organizations have documented the way in which firms exploit the law to replicate existing power advantages they hold over individuals with whom they dealemployees, customers, and care and service recipients (Edelman and Suchman 1997; 1999) .
One of the best ways to do this might be with form-contracts because contracts lend the impression of legal constraints, and by implication, invoke the State as the background sanctioning body of the contents of the contract, lending the impression of legitimacy and authority to the drafters (Eigen 2008) . As Richard Ely remarked, "when economic forces make possible oppression and deprivation of liberty, oppression and deprivation of liberty express themselves in contract" (Kaufman 2003: 8) .
One way that the question of whether form-contracts' benefits outweigh their detriments has been explored has been by cataloguing the contents of typical form-adhesive contracts such as end-user-license agreements ("EULA"s) and related online boilerplate, and measuring their exploitative terms. For instance, Marotta-Wurgler (2008) analyzed the contents of 647 software license agreements, finding that sellers with market power do not offer unusually harsh terms in the form-adhesive contracts they draft and promulgate.
However, it may be the case that even if the terms themselves are not unusually exploitive, individuals' tend not to read them, as evidenced by other work by Marotta-Wurgler (2011b) and others (Eigen 2012a; Plaut and Bartlett 2011) . So, it might be important to empirically evaluate the extent to which reading matters for performance (or non-performance) of contract terms, and the extent to which individuals' perceptions of the contracts are relevant to contract performance and behavior. An experiment by the author offers evidence that suggests that readership is positively correlated with performance of a contract (Eigen 2012a) .
Others have demonstrated that contracts have signaling effects-such as more completeness as a signal of less trust and cooperation (Chou, Halevy and Murninghan 2012) . A qualitative study of employees who had signed mandatory arbitration agreements revealed varied beliefs about the contents and effects of those contracts, in spite of low readership rates (Eigen 2008) .
Besides this, there appears to be a growing public sense of the opportunity for exploitation as being sufficiently worrisome, even independent of the terms themselves.
Perhaps the most unsettling popular example of this is an episode of Southpark, which first aired on Comedy Central on April 27, 2011.
6 In this episode, a boy and two others are forced to submit to a horrific experiment because they clicked to agree to Apple's iTunes end-user license agreement. When he discovers the terms to which he consented even though he does not read English, one of the victims declares, "I should have never updated iTunes!" Echoing this concern has been an academic voice. For instance, in an article aptly titled, "They Can Do
What!?" Alces and Greenfield note that " [t] here is something about [unilateral change-ofterms provisions common in consumer form-contracts] that rankles" (2010: 1107). In short, it is still unclear to what extent perceptions about contracts derived less from reading them, and more from popular perceptions and other sources, impact contracting behavior. It is also unclear whether there are any measurable effects associated with these perceptions and behaviors.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Empirical work on contracts is growing. Research has continued to ask and answer important questions. Often, empirical work has tested theory and sometimes helped extend it.
This is a productive, symbiotic relationship, and I hope it continues. Any recommendations I have are surely reflective of my own biases as an empirical contracts scholar. With that as a caveat, here are first some substantive suggestions for directions of empirical work on contracts, followed by some methodological suggestions.
Substance
There has been a disproportionate focus on answering the question, "what terms are in contracts?" This is an important question, and not one that should be ignored. Indeed, it would be useful to empirically test the degree to which terms are unilaterally (or bilaterally) altered over time in response to the claim that the prevalence of unilateral-change terms in contracts is irksome (Alces and Greenfield 2010) . However, more work needs to be done answering the
questions, "what is the relationship between contract terms and performance, breach, or renegotiation?" and "are contract terms associated with contractor characteristics or contracting settings?" It seems that these are questions that could be taken up more frequently by everyone, but particularly by sociologists and negotiation scholars who have contributed less than one might expect to empirical contract scholarship.
Additionally, while there has been some empirical attention paid to form-adhesive contracting, particularly in online transactions, there is significantly less known about individual behavior with respect to such contracts than bilateral contracts. Given the disproportionate rate at which individuals enter into form-contracts relative to bilaterally negotiated ones, more work in this area is clearly needed. One important, relatively understudied area is the extent to which variation in contract formation matters to performance, breach, or renegotiation. A recent experiment offered initial experimental evidence that notice of contract terms and increased participation in the pre-consent phase of contracting are associated with increased performance (Eigen 2012b) . But, more work in this area seems sorely needed.
Two related areas in need of empirical work are exploration of the effects of renegotiation and informal contracting behavior. Most of the work in these areas has been in finance (Roberts and Sufi 2009) , dealing with experimentally contrived "buyers and sellers" (Fehr, Hart and Zehnder 2011a) , and involving inter-firm contracting (Lumineau and Quelin 2012) . In spite of claims made about renegotiation in the consumer context obviating the concerns raised about consumer form-contracts being bad for consumers (Bebchuk and Posner 2006; Johnston 2006), there are no empirical studies on the rates of ex-post renegotiation of contracts, or on the related question of selective enforceability of contracts. Selective enforcement of unfavorable contract terms has been suggested to occur along socio-economic status lines (Eigen 2008 ), but no empirical work has been done to support or refute this. With informal contracting, context seems to matter greatly (Gil 2010) , and the effects of informality have been studied. However, seemingly no attention has been empirically paid to the degree to which informality of contracting obligation matters when the base-rate expectation of formality is high or low.
Endogeneity problems associated with contracting parties who know each other selecting the kinds of agreements to bind themselves (formal versus informal) potentially call into question the generalizability of the findings in some studies in this area. So, this too is a fertile area for future exploration.
Another instance of theory being relatively untested is the questions of whether and to what extent individuals perceive the terms in their mostly unread form-contracts to be innocuous or oppressive, and the degree to which it matters to individuals (if at all) whether the terms in form-contracts are perceived as oppressive. Given the relative paucity of empirical work on the degree to which contracts substitute for trust, and the fact that within the findings in this area, there is no clear answer, more empirical work could be done here. In many instances of form-contracting, there are clear promises made about the exchange that are sometimes inconsistent with the terms in the fine print. A productive area in which to study trust and reciprocity could be when contracting entities are consistent (trustworthy) or inconsistent (untrustworthy) between what they promise (verbally, or in an advertisement) and in the terms they unilaterally foist on individuals to sign in order to receive the benefit of the original promise.
Lastly, as more attention is paid to the "Occupy Wall Street" and related movements, it could also be useful to examine the extent to which individuals want to and would be willing to contractual what-if scenarios involved an online setting in which subjects were randomly assigned to different contractual conditions (and a control condition of no contract) (Eigen 2012b) . In all but one condition, subjects consented to the terms of the research via contracts of varying degrees of adhesiveness. The experiment measured subjects' behaviors on the task purportedly obligated by the live contracts. Of course, there are significant limitations of this research design too. In the interest of promoting methodological diversity, and in gaining some traction by increasing external validity in some studies, I hope others design experiments on contracts inspired by the creative work of Cialdini (1971) , and more recently by Salganik and Duncan (2008) , which also exploits the Internet as a laboratory for behavioral experimentation.
CONCLUSION
Recent empirical advances have shown us that contracts are dynamic, not static, instruments, interpretable only in the context in which they are embedded, often lacking objectively interpretable meaning, and as capable of being framed in different ways to generate varied behavioral outcomes as measured by performance, breach, repeat exchange, and other measures. Instead, it is perhaps more useful to construe contracts as prisms, refracting the light through which situational framings and contexts shine. Interpretation of contract requires an understanding of the instruments' context, and perhaps most importantly, a willingness to cast aside presumptions of enforceability of contract heretofore nearly universally present implicitly or explicitly in non-empirical scholarship, policy, and legal opinions. In the context of formadhesive contracts, empirical work seems to benefit from an acknowledgement of the effects of the misalignment of contract as imagined-as the product of bilateral negotiations-and contract as experienced-as a foisted jumble of fine print often intentionally obscured, made too complicated to decipher, and sometimes downplayed (Sullivan 2007 ) by drafting organizations.
The fruitful research advanced by empirical contracts scholars validates Suchman's (2003) description of contracts as social artifacts. Contracts as social artifacts take on meaning far beyond the four corners of the written terms themselves, and upon inspection, offer significant insight into social and economic exchange in private life. This review of recent empirical work on contracts reveals the fungibility of contract and the rule of law in what could be characterized as post-Durkheimian and post-Weberian contemporary life, wherein the role of law is reduced, and perhaps more importantly, compartmentalized-ending up functioning more as a parallel or shadow of other extra-legal sources of power, authority, status, and norms of exchange, instead of as a driving force moderating or mediating social and economic exchange on its own. As this review reveals, there is much more to learn about how individuals experience and interpret contracts. Hopefully, the groundwork is laid for continued empirical research, necessary to better understand contracting behaviors and their effects on outcomes of exchange in contemporary life. 
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Figure 1: Conceptualization of the 8 Empirical Questions of Contracts as Polarized by Two Propositions About Contracts
